Should the U.S. unilaterally disavow offensive cyber weapons
Should the U.S. unilaterally disavow offensive cyber weapons
Readings:
Books: Valeriano, chapter 8; Singer, sections beginning on p. 118, 122, 185
Articles: NATO, The Tallinn Manual (introduction, p.1-11); Atlantic Council, Tallinn Manual Fact Sheet; The White House, The International Strategy for Cyberspace (p.9-11); Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed; Clark, At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic Concepts and Issues, section 5.4.3 (p. 71); Mazanec, Why International Order in Cyberspace Is Not Inevitable; Rabkin, To Confront Cyber Threats, We Must Rethink the Law of Armed Conflict; Osula et. al, International Cyber Norms (introduction), and Segal, The Top Five Cyber Policy Developments of 2015: United States-China Cyber Agreement
Videos: Georgetown University 2014 International Engagement on Cyber Conference, panel on cyber norms, found here:
Should the U.S. unilaterally disavow offensive cyber weapons (as President Nixon did with offensive biological weapons) in order to promote a norm against possessing or using such weapons?
Would using ISPs to cut off/block all Internet traffic from a country and effectively enact a “cyber blockade” be an act of war in cyberspace?